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Abstract 
Categorical distinctions such as healthy/sick or dead/alive serve to provide orienta-
tion and to facilitate decision-making in medicine. This is a major issue in the the-
ory of reflexive modernisation. Recently, new scientific insights within genetics 
have increasingly prompted the re-drawing of such boundaries. Taking the exam-
ple of prenatal testing, with particular reference to late term abortion, I investigate 
the governing rationalities of experts' boundary politics. It will be shown that 
boundary drawing is structured with reference to society's guiding principles and 
notions of normality. In those problematic cases where the medical frame is un-
able to deliver sufficient interpretative power, this reference to societal value orien-
tations turns out to be functional for maintaining the experts' professional author-
ity. In the case of prenatally diagnosable disabilities, for example, experts often do 
not know how to deal with such diagnoses. This ambiguity is for the most part 
understood as (cognitive) uncertainty amenable to more research, rather than in-
terpreted as non-knowledge with reference to the level of social action which re-
sults from the interpretative failure of biomedical frames. Thus, the interpretation 
of non-knowledge appears to become unambiguous, which undermines any pend-
ing politicisation of non-knowledge. The alignment with society's guiding princi-
ples turns out to be functional for maintaining the claim to be able to provide ade-
quate and relevant information and terms for decision-making processes; in other 
words, for maintaining professional authority. On the basis of the observation that 
experts have to deal with uncertainty and non-knowledge, the article asks in con-
clusion whether this could point to the possible emergence of a reflexive type of 
expert. 
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1 Introduction 
Seen from the perspective of sociology, 
human genetics and reproduction 
medicine are a dynamic technological 
field which not only implies a higher 
degree of control in terms of the circu-
lation of expert knowledge, but above 
all introduces new uncertainties and 
design necessities. For example, Gid-
dens (1991) has employed the term 'life 
politics' as a way of analysing repro-
ductive medicine as a motor for the 
transformation of identity practices 
and a new active politics of the physi-
cal. 
The following discussion does not 
address these newly emerging design 
necessities on the level of everyday life 
and common normalised handling of 
new technologies. Rather, it is the level 
of professional action and decision-
making that is of interest here. Espe-
cially in the field of prenatal testing, 
technological progress has overex-
tended institutionalised decision-
making conventions, resulting in novel 
requirements for decision-making and 
design. In connection with the theory 
of reflexive modernisation, this proc-
ess is discussed with reference to the 
concept of boundary blurring ("Ent-
grenzung").1 In our case, this term 
refers to the growing ambiguity of 
categorical distinctions (Beck/Bonß/ 
Lau 2004: 40-41). Such 'boundary 
work' performed by experts is ac-
                                                                 
1 "Entgrenzung" means a process of trans-
gressing boundaries or, in a narrower 
sense, a process in which boundaries be-
come insignificant or irrelevant. Boundary 
blurring cannot be equated with dediffer-
entiation ("Entdifferenzierung"), but refers 
to phenomena below the level of functional 
subsystems. Boundary blurring is fre-
quently discussed in sociology, in various 
fields: in connection with flexibilisation 
and autonomisation ("Eigenarbeit") 
(Minssen 2000; Kratzer 2003), with the 
blurring of enterprise boundaries (Powell 
1991; Sauer/Döhl 1997), with globalisation 
and sub-politicisation (Castells 1996; Beck 
1986), and in discussions of the complete 
dissolution of the subject-object differen-
tiation with hybridisation (Latour 1993). 
knowledged as an institutional neces-
sity, not merely a legitimisation strat-
egy of a particular profession. 
The modern biomedical sciences are a 
fruitful field for the analysis of phe-
nomena of boundary blurring. In the 
case of Chorea Huntington, a mono-
genetic hereditary disease, the basic 
principle of distinguishing between 
healthy and sick starts to shift due to 
the divergence between possible early 
detection and the late manifestation of 
symptoms. Is someone who does not 
yet have symptoms healthy, or sick 
because he bears the genetic disposi-
tion which will inescapably lead to the 
manifestation of the disease (Scholz 
1995: 48)? Breast cancer provides a 
further illustration. Although this dis-
ease is attributed to a genetic compo-
nent,2 no strong causality between a 
specific DNA sequence and phenotype 
has yet been demonstrated. Conse-
quently, it is only possible to prognos-
ticate the risk of disease, the extent of 
which remains mostly uncertain 
(Lemke 2004: 71). The distinction 
healthy/sick therefore becomes blurred 
on the level of aetiology. Another ex-
ample is stem cell research. In the 
ongoing ethical debate relating to the 
destruction of embryos as an inevita-
ble consequence of growing embryonic 
stem cell lines, it has become obvious 
that a scientific determination of the 
beginning of life is not possible. Bio-
ethical debates, as a consequence, 
relate to the pluralisation of the 
life/death distinction (Viehöver 2005). 
Cognition-oriented and decision-
relieving boundary constructs in pre-
natal testing are also being stretched 
to the limit as a result of increasing 
scientification and advances in medi-
cine. My interest focuses on the reac-
tion modes of experts, as well as on 
the consequences of these modes of 
                                                                 
2 Currently it is assumed that mutations of 
both genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2 (‘breast 
cancer’), which serve to protect against 
tumour growth, contribute to the manifes-
tation of breast cancer. 
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dealing with uncertainty and non-
knowledge. In the following I will ar-
gue that the ways in which experts 
draw boundaries are structured with 
reference to society's guiding princi-
ples (like autonomy, self-awareness 
and individual responsibility) and no-
tions of normality. 
In those problematic cases where the 
medical frame is unable to deliver suf-
ficient interpretative power, this refer-
ence to societal value orientations 
turns out to be functional for main-
taining the experts' professional au-
thority. In the case of prenatally diag-
nosable disabilities, for example, ex-
perts in many cases do not know how 
to deal with such diagnoses. This am-
biguity is for the most part understood 
as (cognitive) uncertainty amenable to 
more research, rather than interpreted 
as non-knowledge with reference to 
the level of social action which results 
from the interpretative failure of bio-
medical frames. Thus, the interpreta-
tion of non-knowledge appears to 
become unambiguous, which under-
mines any pending politicisation of 
non-knowledge. The alignment with 
society's guiding principles turns out 
to be functional for maintaining pro-
fessional authority. 
A challenge for this authority arises 
from prenatal testing being still ethi-
cally controversial. In addition, public 
debates sustain about whether or not 
the ideology of eugenics and of human 
genetics tend to converge. By profes-
sional authority I understand human 
genetics' claims of competence for the 
explanation of the phenomenon of 
disability based on the legitimacy to 
subsume pertinent phenomena within 
the professional interpretation and 
relevance framework. In other words, 
professionals claim to be able to pro-
vide adequate and relevant informa-
tion and terms for decision-making 
processes. I will develop this argumen-
tation on the basis of two empirical 
studies conducted within the frame-
work of two research projects.3 
The concept of non-knowledge serves 
to highlight the fact that dealing with 
phenomena such as genetic anomalies 
in biomedical frames is not trivial but 
implies certain expert practices. Obvi-
ously, non-knowledge is – in contrast 
to frequently held beliefs – not neces-
sarily functional for science. By differ-
entiating the term, it will be made clear 
that non-knowledge implies various 
options for dealing with open ques-
tions such as further research or poli-
ticisation. 
From a theoretical point of view the 
intention is to combine two completely 
different sociological discourses, the 
modernisation theory-oriented debate 
about boundary politics (Beck/Bonß/ 
Lau 2004) and the constructivist analy-
sis of non-knowledge (Luhmann 
1995). My aim is to develop a knowl-
edge-sociological analysis of expert 
practice in the field of human genetics, 
critically assessing the competency 
claims of medicine. In the process I 
will introduce the German-language 
sociological debate on non-knowl-
edge, since it has contributed consid-
erably to sharpening this concept (sec-
tion 2).4 On the basis of a typology of 
                                                                 
3 The research project "Life-Politics in the 
Risk Society" (No. 8885) was supported by 
the jubilee fund of the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Austria (Oesterreichische Na-
tionalbank) and carried out at the Institute 
for Advanced Studies, Vienna. The research 
project "Life Science in European Society" 
(QLG7-CT-1999-00286) was supported by 
the European Commission, DG Research; 
the Austrian case study was conducted at 
the Institute of Technology Assessment of 
the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. 
4 So far, the topic of non-knowledge has 
only been discussed in sociological obser-
vation of human genetics in the context of 
the frequently debated right to non-
knowledge (Wehling 2003a). Against the 
background of expanding capabilities of 
predictive genetic diagnostics and possible 
discrimination dangers from employers 
and insurance companies, there has been a 
discussion since the 1980s of the extent to 
which an informal or formal right not to 
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knowledge forms, I will argue that 
prenatally diagnosable disabilities 
transcend the defining categories of 
modern medicine. As a consequence, 
new differentiations and boundaries 
have to be found (section 3). The prob-
lematique of boundary politics is high-
lighted in the case of late term abor-
tion. Legal and medical developments 
are accompanied by the blurring and 
reconstruction of boundaries by ex-
perts, though with a close link to so-
cietal guiding principles (section 4). 
Experts' taking into account of other 
knowledge forms and alternative ra-
tionalities (in counselling and in 
boundary politics) suggests that a re-
flexive type of expert could emerge. I 
argue, however, that these very prac-
tices contribute to the legitimisation of 
a medical genetic interpretation frame-
work for prenatally diagnosable dis-
abilities (section 5). 
 
2 Non-knowledge in the knowl-
edge society 
According to the hypothesis that mod-
ern societies are becoming increas-
ingly fragile, as put forward by Nico 
Stehr (2000), it is precisely because of 
the growing importance of knowledge 
in all areas of life and institutions that 
societal uncertainties and non-
knowledge are coming to the fore. It 
would be an over-simplification to 
treat non-knowledge as a deficit that 
needs to be overcome. According to 
Helmut Willke (2002), knowledge in 
the knowledge society is, in view of 
uncontrollable systemic risks,5 consti-
                                                                              
have to know your own genetic predisposi-
tion can be founded and legally anchored. 
This discussion of non-knowledge, how-
ever, has taken place on the intentional 
level of „not-wanting-to-know" rather than 
on a functional level. 
5 Systemic risks are new forms of risk 
which cannot be localised, or for which 
personal responsibility cannot be identi-
fied; they emerge from an 'interlinkage of 
risks' and usually result in a destabilisation 
of the system. Willke mentions the world 
tuted by expertise in the treatment of 
non-knowledge. Non-knowledge here 
is not characterised by a preliminary 
lack of knowledge, but by a fundamen-
tal uncertainty that cannot be elimi-
nated (ibid.: 11). Willke's notion of 
'crisis', therefore, refers to more than 
mere a loss of credibility or deficiency 
in knowledge. It signifies the inability 
to deal with non-knowledge in a com-
petent way, because non-knowledge, 
being the other, complementary side of 
the coin of knowledge, has not yet 
been appropriated and made manage-
able (ibid.: 18).  
The category of non-knowledge has 
also been systematically introduced 
into the sociology of science. Taking 
the example of high energy experimen-
tal physics, Karin Knorr Cetina (1999), 
for instance, describes a change in the 
epistemology of the natural sciences. 
After the objects of observation, due to 
their physical characteristics, have 
been turned into virtual objects and 
into products of an experimental ma-
chinery, scientists are forced to adopt 
a new methodological self-reflexivity. 
Obstacles to cognition, ambiguities, 
and thus the boundaries of knowledge 
come into the centre of the analysis. 
By making the diverse causes of sys-
tematic misjudgements part of the 
reflection, physics "has forged a coali-
tion with the evil that bars knowledge, 
by turning these barriers into a princi-
ple of knowledge" (ibid.: 64). The 'sim-
ple' generation of knowledge is re-
placed by a process of specifying non-
knowledge. In addition, the door is 
kept open for the production of posi-
tive knowledge.  
The knowledge society presents itself 
as a society which is not just based on 
'knowledge', but also – speaking in 
terms of systems theory – on the 'form' 
of knowledge, i.e. on a distinction 
(prior to the indication of anything 
specific) that equally includes non-
                                                                              
financial system and the Internet as in-
stances thereof. 
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knowledge.6 Knowledge societies are 
therefore essentially characterised by 
the acute increase in the significance 
of non-knowledge: first, through the 
systematic production of non-
knowledge, and second, through the 
forced societal management of non-
knowledge.7 
Even though the category of non-
knowledge has only recently become a 
subject of systematic reflection and 
conceptual work (see Japp 1997; Weh-
ling 2003b), the interest of sociology in 
this topic can be traced back to the 
point where controversies over risk 
and ecological crises indicated the 
limits of scientific knowledge. Conse-
quently, early conceptualisations were 
developed with close reference to risk 
and uncertainty (Collingridge 1980; 
Wynne 1992; Funtowicz/Ravetz 1993). 
This aspect is still relevant. To date, 
conflicts over risk or technologies 
related to serious ecological and/or 
health damages have been the main 
subjects stimulating empirical analyses 
with a focus on non-knowledge.8 Al-
though these analyses are grounded in 
incongruent basic assumptions, they 
agree that non-knowledge is not nec-
essarily functional for scientific re-
search any more: the basic assumption 
                                                                 
6 For the notion of 'form', see Luhmann 
1991: 23, 59-60. 
7 From this perspective, technology as-
sessment (TA) can be seen as an early at-
tempt to achieve institutionalised anticipa-
tion of consequences, though under opti-
mistic assumptions concerning their con-
trol. Accordingly, it is the expert who is the 
only one who knows about the limitations 
of scientific knowledge and the specifica-
tion of non-knowledge (van den Daele 
1996); boundary-drawing between knowl-
edge and non-knowledge appears as a 
cognitive process. Against this background, 
the development of participatory TA 
(Joss/Bellucci 2002; Abels/Bora 2004) can 
be understood as an attempt to ensure that 
experts do not have sole responsibility for  
boundary-drawing.  
8 For the example of chemical policy see 
Böschen (2000); for the example of mad 
cow disease (BSE) see Dressel (2002), Japp 
(2002a). 
that non-knowledge would, inevitably, 
lead to new knowledge is now con-
tested. Thus, non-knowledge is not 
primarily seen as a precondition for 
problem solving, a perspective ad-
vanced by Robert Merton (1987) with 
his notion of 'specified ignorance'. 
Merton argued that in order to gener-
ate new knowledge one has to specify 
non-knowledge, and was the first to 
emphasise the kind of non-knowledge 
that was functional for enabling fur-
ther research. Forms of non-
knowledge that could not be tackled 
were left aside. 
The following discussion deals with 
the conceptualisation of non-knowl-
edge within the two 'grand theories' in 
which it has become most relevant: the 
theory of reflexive modernisation of 
Ulrich Beck, and Niklas Luhmann's 
constructivist systems theory. 
2.1 The modernisation-critical posi-
tion 
Beck (1996) refers to the notion of 
non-knowledge in order to distinguish 
his model of reflexive modernisation 
from alternative perspectives (e.g. Gid-
dens 1990). According to Beck, it is not 
the mere accumulation and globalisa-
tion of knowledge that allows us to 
characterise modernity as 'reflexive', 
but rather the recognition of non-
knowledge. Risks and dangers which 
emerge in the course of the process of 
modernisation must not, for the sake 
of the preservation of the status quo, 
become visible as systemically induced 
consequences of modernisation. Thus 
the struggle over the conditions of 
definition becomes vital for political 
reforms, together with the clarification 
of the boundary between knowledge 
and non-knowledge.9  
                                                                 
9 Giddens' theory of modernisation offers a 
somewhat different account; he links the 
reflexivity of modernity closely to the diffu-
sion and circularity of expert knowledge. It 
is not non-knowledge that is the engine 
driving reflexive modernisation, but a con-
glomeration of different mechanisms which 
can be subsumed generally under global-
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According to Beck, in order to arrive at 
reflexivity it is necessary to gain 
knowledge about non-knowledge. 
Non-knowledge appears to be a con-
fined area that is static and objectively 
'given'. The complementary area of 
non-knowledge shares common fea-
tures with his notion of risks as appar-
ently objective and 'pre-discursive' 
threats posed by technology (Beck 
1986). In other words, it appears to be 
independent in its existence of any 
knowledge conflicts (and therefore a 
priori to them), but dependent in its 
scope on current claims (and articula-
tions) of knowledge.10 Insuperable and 
unforeseeable non-knowledge – in 
Beck's terms (1996: 302) a 'Not-being-
able-to-know' ("Nicht-Wissen-Kön-
nen") – does not have a systematic 
place in this perspective, and the 
causes and processes of the constitu-
tion of such non-knowledge are, in 
fact, of secondary interest. Given the 
assumption of the existence of a cer-
tain objectively available ('knowable') 
area of knowledge, the analysis has to 
focus on the suppression and omission 
of non-knowledge ('Not-wanting-to-
know'; "Nicht-Wissen-Wollen"). This 
means that there is a danger of an 
intentional reduction of the problem of 
non-knowledge. 
                                                                              
isation and the institutionalisation of 
knowledge (Giddens 1990). Thus, reflexivity 
appears as a general feature of modernity. 
With the development of an 'institutional 
reflexivity', consequences that are already 
potentially inherent catch up with moder-
nity. Giddens, unlike Beck, does not postu-
late a structural rupture within modernity, 
and he does not need to provide empirical 
evidence of a transition towards a 'second' 
modernity. Compared to Beck, his rather 
linear model of knowledge of reflexive 
modernisation provides less opportunity 
for the endogenous precariousness of 
rationality to become apparent. 
10 In the end, such an epistemological real-
ism assumes the 'accessability' of reality 
through observation; this is supported by 
the argument that it is precisely ignorance 
of, and the denial of knowledge about, the 
dangers to which industrialisation gives 
rise that lead to an increase in real dangers 
(Beck 1996: 311). 
In his attempt to differentiate the cate-
gories introduced by Beck while avoid-
ing the problems mentioned above, 
Peter Wehling (2003b: 124-126) distin-
guishes three dimensions of non-
knowledge. First, he distinguishes 
known from unknown non-knowledge 
(criterion of knowledge). Here, non-
knowledge refers to preliminary 
knowledge gaps and ambiguities, the 
deficient character of which is well 
known. In contrast, phenomena where 
it is still unclear that something is not 
known, or rather, what it is that is not 
known, are referred to as 'unknown 
non-knowledge'. Second, temporary 
non-knowledge is distinguished from 
permanent (enduring) non-knowledge 
(criterion of time). The question of 
whether non-knowledge is insuperable 
or resolvable, i.e. whether it is 'specifi-
able' in the sense of Merton and there-
fore open to further analysis, is espe-
cially important with regard to the 
acceptance and funding of research 
(Wehling 2004: 73). A third dimension 
of non-knowledge refers to the crite-
rion of intentionality. This distinction 
between non-knowledge we are either 
aware or unaware of, with the latter 
being inevitable, is part of Beck's ac-
tion-theoretical perspective. Non-
knowledge is primarily seen as a con-
sequence of individual action and de-
cision-making (what could the actor 
have known? what should he have 
known?); thus, there are significant 
moral implications.11  
Wehling's attempt to discuss the con-
cept of non-knowledge, which still has 
insufficient empirical backing, with the 
goal of systematising it, is instructive. 
His comparatively thorough differen-
tiation of the term is directed against 
the 'thin' typology suggested by sys-
tems theory (see below), and strives 
for the development of a comprehen-
sive research programme. Ultimately, it 
aims to analyse the processes of emer-
                                                                 
11 For instance, Wehling (2003: 126) refers 
to non-knowledge sustained in the face of  
better judgement. 
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gence, communication and processing 
of non-knowledge. These concepts 
allow the reformulation (and an alter-
native discussion) of controversies 
about risk, and empirical case studies 
will indicate their descriptive potential 
(for a first step see Böschen 2002). 
At the same time, Wehling's concept 
bears a certain resemblance to Beck's 
approach. Non-knowledge is concep-
tualised as the result of a process of 
construction and assignment, and at 
the same time non-knowledge refers 
to more or less objectively knowable 
phenomena, thus existing prior to 
(any) discourse. This becomes evident 
in Wehling's description of the hole in 
the ozone layer (2004: 75-79), where 
he analyses the transformation of non-
knowledge with regard to the process 
of catching up with the explanations of 
already manifest consequences (trig-
gered off by CFC). An implicit reference 
to Beck's realism of hazard runs the 
risk of, in principle, considering non-
knowledge as a deficit that needs to be 
overcome. For hazards can only be 
averted with the help of knowledge; 
they grow without such knowledge. If 
non-knowledge remains associated – 
in an ultimately essentialist way – with 
a knowledge deficit or "knowledge 
gaps" (Wehling 2004: 69), then we 
might lose sight of the fact that (non-
)knowledge results from contingent 
processes of construction, which can 
always take an alternative form – to be 
precise, in a way that is independent of 
real progress in knowledge. 
2.2 The constructivist position  
Although Luhmann's analysis of non-
knowledge (1992) has its origin in 
ecological problems, it does not offer a 
criticism of institutions. Rather, the 
radical dimension of this kind of 
analysis results from its epistemologi-
cal approach. In order to perform an 
observation, and hence to generate 
significance, the observer (in 
Luhmann's terminology) must focus on 
one side of the discrimination made 
which subsequently becomes relevant 
for any further operation. Concomi-
tantly, an 'unmarked space' is being 
produced. As this is done, non-
knowledge becomes a necessary con-
stituent of any knowledge production. 
The accumulation of knowledge can, 
according to Luhmann (1995: 177), 
only result in a progressive reproduc-
tion of non-knowledge; there can be 
no gradual transformation of non-
knowledge into knowledge.12 
Japp (1997) follows this conceptualisa-
tion of non-knowledge. It has system-
atically developed the 'eigenvalue' of 
its object of research. Japp distin-
guishes, in a more pronounced way 
than Luhmann, between specific and 
unspecific non-knowledge.13 Specific 
non-knowledge corresponds termino-
logically to Beck's notion of 'Not-yet-
knowledge' ("Noch-Nicht-Wissen"). Yet 
unlike Beck, Japp (2002a: 43-48) places 
the emphasis on the systematic differ-
ence between facts and form of knowl-
edge. Overcoming it is always an ac-
complishment of construction from 
the viewpoint of the observer; there-
fore, the question of connectability 
("Anschlussfähigkeit") is paramount. 
Ambiguities can, on the one hand, be 
mitigated (with reference to particular 
value judgements) in such a way that 
non-knowledge is characterised as a 
cognitive problem rather than a trigger 
for political conflict. In this sense, 
specific non-knowledge is a form of 
non-knowledge that can be normal-
ised on a medium-term basis and 
transformed into 'secure' knowledge, 
                                                                 
12 Apart from the constructivist description 
of non-knowledge, there are also 'realistic' 
points of reference in the systems theo-
rists’ approach. From this perspective, 
non-knowledge is seen as a product of 
complexity and therefore allocated on a 
factual level; see Willke (2002). 
13 In fact, Luhmann (1995) distinguishes 
between specified ('marked') and unspeci-
fied non-knowledge. However, he does not 
look into the sociologically relevant ques-
tions of the circumstances under which 
either of the two kinds of non-knowledge 
is referred to, and what  consequences 
follow from this.  
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even if there is considerable disagree-
ment amongst experts over the course 
of such a transformation. On the other 
hand, specific non-knowledge is a 
form of knowledge that refers to com-
parison or probabilities. Hence, it al-
lows us to bring out uncertainties and 
to ask for risk assessments. In other 
words: the specificity of non-knowl-
edge is emphasised, while non-knowl-
edge (as such) is highlighted – depend-
ing on the degree to which uncertainty 
is accepted and science and technol-
ogy are trusted. 
Unspecific non-knowledge is a con-
struction which rejects the validity 
claims of (expert) knowledge as well as 
those of specific non-knowledge. It is 
a form of societal self-description in 
which uncertainty is labelled as poten-
tially catastrophic. The reaction to 
such a 'potentiality of illimitable dam-
age' is to demand 'avoidance behav-
iour', i.e. not to adopt certain available 
(technical) options. Unspecific non-
knowledge, actually a form of not con-
nectable non-knowledge (how should 
one speak about something that is 
simply unknown?), can only be as-
serted in a meaningful way through 
the communication of the 'catastrophe' 
as a symbol of what is to be avoided 
(Japp 2002b: 436). This is the case 
especially when new and unknown 
phenomena or developments are re-
garded as beyond the scope of scien-
tific knowledge. This means that in 
principle, they transcend the explana-
tory potential of scientific knowledge, 
are considered unpredictable and un-
controllable with regard to science, 
and furthermore become, or are turned 
into, a potential threat. We can under-
stand this process as a generalisation 
of non-knowledge. 
The political consequences of this 
generalisation with regard to knowl-
edge and technological conflicts are 
well known. The assignment of unspe-
cific non-knowledge involves the dan-
ger, as Helga Nowotny (2005: 41-42) 
argues with regard to the loss of au-
thority of experts, that laypersons re-
nounce their loyalty to experts and 
consider taking the 'exit option'. They 
could abandon the discourse with 
scientific experts and 'cross over' to the 
political system: they could, by means 
of initiatives or demonstrations, influ-
ence science, legislation and the regu-
lation of research.  
One of the strengths of the construc-
tivist position is that it helps to under-
stand non-knowledge as a co-
produced phenomenon and therefore 
as a logical necessity. The sociologi-
cally relevant questions, then, are how 
processes of acknowledgement of 
(non-)knowledge develop, and how 
claims of (non-)knowledge turn into 
(non-)knowledge. Following an impor-
tant trend in science research one can 
ask, for instance, in which way a rep-
resentational relationship is estab-
lished between 'clean', decontextual-
ised laboratory objects and the reality 
of nature (e.g. Latour 1999: chapter 2). 
Wehling's differentiated terminology is 
probably the best way of capturing 
such processes, if they can be captured 
at all. 
Japp's strict constructivism, on the 
other hand, could overcome the per-
spective of a symmetrical relation be-
tween knowledge and non-knowledge 
(i.e. that acquiring knowledge should 
inevitably be linked to reducing non-
knowledge). Due to the absence of a 
privileged observer position, assigning 
something to knowledge or non-
knowledge is, in the end, a normative 
decision. Non-knowledge is therefore 
a construction that leaves open every 
political option. In some situations, 
and in the view of those who look 
sceptically at a plan or project (for 
whatever reason), the readiness to 
acknowledge non-knowledge is so low 
that critics and whistleblowers can 
easily prevail. In other situations, there 
is no communication about non-
knowledge or rather non -knowledge is 
communicated as uncertain knowl-
edge or knowledge not yet established, 
irrespective of any perceived advance 
in knowledge. 
Alexander Bogner, Non-Knowledge and Uncertainty 25 
 
 
Finally, from such a perspective non-
knowledge appears less as a cognitive 
but rather as a social phenomenon. A 
certain way of communicating, in the 
case of unspecific non-knowledge 
often associated with the (aggressive) 
claims of persons affected (Japp 1999: 
30), is taken as a certain way of as-
signing non-knowledge. As a result, 
conflicts not necessarily centred 
around ecological risks also become 
accessible to the category of non-
knowledge. The following investigation 
of prenatal testing uses this perspec-
tive. 
 
3  Prenatal testing, its develop-
ment and its relevance 
Prenatal testing and genetic counsel-
ling span the fields of human genetics 
and medicine. While prenatal testing in 
the early 1970s was merely a sideline 
for human geneticists, it has since 
differentiated itself from the field of 
human genetics, become successfully 
institutionalised, and now, as part of 
gynaecology, is considered a core as-
pect of pregnancy care (Nippert 
1991).14 In 1966 the first cultivation of 
foetal cells suspended in amniotic fluid 
was successful. This was seen as a 
decisive step towards the cytogenetic 
and biochemical detection of foetal 
anomalies. The first prenatal detection 
of Morbus Down was performed in 
1968. 
While prenatal testing is not restricted 
to DNA analyses (in fact the majority of 
examinations employ ultrasound), 
prenatal testing has now become an 
important field of activity for genetic 
counselling. Current figures show this. 
                                                                 
14 Prenatal testing includes examinations 
and tests relating to the development of 
the foetus over the course of pregnancy. 
Ultrasound is the most common form of 
non-invasive prenatal testing. In addition 
there are invasive diagnostics, i.e. surgical 
interventions which sample cells from the 
unborn child and test them, mostly for 
Down’s syndrome (amniocentesis, chori-
onic villus sampling). 
In 1970, when prenatal testing was 
introduced in Germany, only six am-
niocenteses were registered.15 Shortly 
thereafter prenatal testing was added 
to the catalogue of services provided 
by compulsory health insurance and 
already by the mid-1980s (in the 
meantime chorionic villus sampling 
(CVS) had been introduced) over 
30,000 amniocenteses and 3,000 CVS 
were registered.16 In 1999 alone ap-
proximately 70,000 invasive examina-
tions were performed. This means that 
roughly every tenth pregnancy in-
volved invasive diagnosis (Nippert 
1999). 
An important factor in this normalisa-
tion process was the way in which 
various court decisions obliged doc-
tors to promote the potential of prena-
tal testing to women over the age of 
35. Hennen et al. (1996: 78) state that 
prenatal testing has almost become a 
standard examination in pregnancy 
care for women over 35. While prena-
tal testing is still ethically controver-
sial, it is predominantly directed to-
wards the early detection of Down's 
syndrome, and is currently the only 
way of preventing the birth of disabled 
children. 
3.1 Transgressing traditional catego-
ries 
In the case of prenatal testing, the 
consequences of an ongoing scientifi-
cation process make it necessary to 
draw boundaries. Recently, Ronald 
Hitzler and Michaela Pfadenhauer 
(1999: 99) have pointed to the fact that 
                                                                 
15 Amniocentesis involves removing amni-
otic fluid in the 16th to 18th week of preg-
nancy by means of transabdominal punc-
ture of the uterus. Foetal cells from the 
amniotic fluid are cultured and analysed in 
the laboratory, mostly for chromosome 
anomalies such as Down’s, Klinefelter, and 
Turner syndrome. 
16 CVS involves removing chorionic tissue 
(a preliminary stage of the placenta geneti-
cally derived from the foetus) by means of 
a needle inserted through the abdominal 
wall or vagina. As with amniocentesis, 
chromosomes (or DNA) can be analysed. 
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improved techniques for diagnosis 
have resulted in precarious data ac-
quired at a very early point in time, 
which transcend the way of coding 
(and separating) 'healthy' and 'sick', a 
constitutive element of modern medi-
cine.17 Our case supports this notion. 
With the help of early prenatal testing 
(e.g. measurement of the nuchal trans-
lucency thickness18), certain distinctive 
features considered to be reliable indi-
cators of the Down's syndrome (so-
called 'soft-markers') can be diagnosed 
as early as the tenth week of preg-
nancy. While Down's syndrome consti-
tutes a chromosomal aberration and 
as such, with regard to the genetic 
paradigm (related basic analysis: ge-
netically normal/abnormal), an abnor-
mality, it is difficult or impossible for 
the prenatal diagnostician to identify 
its 'clinical implication', in other words 
its 'meaning', with regard to the medi-
cal code (healthy/sick). In practice, it is 
obviously difficult for the expert to 
determine medically operationalisable 
criteria to decide whether an abortion 
                                                                 
17 According to the medical code, in 
Luhmann's (1990) terminology, disease 
represents the positive side of the distinc-
tion as it is operationally connectable and 
therefore corresponds to the 'goal of ac-
tion' or the teleology of the system. The 
fact that human genetics establishes a new 
dichotomy, so to speak behind the back of 
medicine, is a development Luhmann was 
aware of. Health is differentiated by the 
introduction of the new categories 'geneti-
cally burdened/not burdened'. However, 
Luhmann confined himself to perceiving 
the interdependency between basic coding 
and (genetically induced) secondary dis-
tinction as a proof of the stable autonomy 
of the medical system. It remains, however, 
unclear how this secondary distinction is 
practically operationalised and what the 
consequences are. In the end, a reasonably 
unconflictual interdependency of the two 
codings has quite a few preconditions; all 
complexity associated with the diagnosis of 
'being genetically burdened' has to be 
countered by discharge mechanisms ("Ent-
lastungsmöglichkeiten") within the logic of 
the medical system. 
18 This measurement is an ultrasound 
evaluation of the thickness of the neck fold 
of the foetus. 
after prenatal testing is legitimate or 
not. The following interview passage 
illustrates the practical difficulties 
involved:  
It is ethically unproblematic if my pre-
natal diagnosis is anencephalus 19; I 
spare the woman a pregnancy, includ-
ing the risks of a pregnancy, and the 
child anyway has no chance of survival 
(…) It is more tricky in the case of vi-
able deformations; because here, of 
course, at some point the question 
arises, how disabled does a child have 
to be that I categorise it as ethically 
justifiable to seriously consider the 
early diagnosis, so that I can perform 
an abortion/kill it? (1:17/41:52) 
Within the continuum of viable dis-
abilities (quantitatively) accounting for 
the major part of prenatal testing, it is 
obviously difficult, on the basis of 
medical knowledge, to provide 'trigger 
points' unconditionally linked to cer-
tain strategies of action, unless the 
diagnosed deformations or genetic 
defects can be reformulated within the 
traditional categories of medicine so 
that they become unambiguous. This 
is the case with anencephalus, because 
it is described as a kind of deformation 
not allowing life after birth. In this 
case it is the distinction alive/dead 
that, as a distinguishing criterion, pro-
vides orientation and relief with regard 
to the decision taken. 
The difficulty of boundary-drawing by 
means of expert knowledge becomes 
apparent from the fact that the expert 
does not pursue, and does not try to 
operationalise, the question of when it 
starts to be 'tricky' to perform prenatal 
testing. The social consequences of 
such a blurred boundary can be ob-
served on the level of interactions. Last 
but not least, in view of professional 
codes regarding genetic counselling, it 
can be said that for such a decision it 
                                                                 
19 Severe deformations in the central nerv-
ous system, caused by a defective closure 
of the neural tube in the development of 
the foetus; babies lack the skullcap and 
substantial parts of the brain. 
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is obviously no longer sufficient to 
refer to expert knowledge alone. Ac-
cordingly, the norm-setting, goal-
oriented, hierarchically structured 
consultation of an expert is not con-
sidered appropriate any more.20 
Against this background, it becomes 
understandable why the unprejudiced, 
process-oriented and client-centred 
ideal of counselling has become so 
popular, as it is easily reconcilable 
with the central value of modern medi-
cal practice, i.e. the autonomy of the 
patient.21 
3.2 A typology of non-knowledge 
I shall now relate the blurring of 
boundaries to some arguments from 
the sociology of knowledge. On the 
level of different forms of knowledge, 
we can essentially distinguish three 
categories: ignorance, uncertainty, and 
non-knowledge. 
a) Ignorance refers to an inadequate or 
preliminary form of knowledge that 
has the potential to be corrected. Prac-
tically, it is about mistakes, errors and 
false statements that can subsequently 
be clarified, for instance by empirical 
data or through a critique of science or 
ideology. From a sociological point of 
view, this level is of secondary impor-
tance.  
b) Uncertainty, or uncertain knowl-
edge, is located on a cognitive level. As 
already mentioned, two forms of un-
certainty can be distinguished with 
regard to human genetics: diagnostic 
uncertainty (what is the probability of 
                                                                 
20 A corresponding plea for non-directive 
forms of counselling, which provide exten-
sive medical-genetic information support-
ing individual decision-making, can be 
found, for example, in GfH (1996). For a 
criticism of the ideal of non-directivity in 
counselling methodically grounded in 
participant observation of counselling 
interviews, see Bosk (1992). 
21 From the perspective of human genetic 
counselling, see Reif/Baitsch (1986). A 
summary with regard to the changing con-
cepts of counselling from the perspective of 
discourse analysis is provided by Wald-
schmidt (1996). 
a disease on the basis of genetic dis-
position?) and prognostic uncertainty 
(when will a disease appear and how 
will it develop?). 
Uncertainties related to indication and 
diagnosis play a crucial role with re-
gard to prenatal testing. In the frame 
of early prenatal testing (e.g. meas-
urement of the nuchal translucency 
thickness), the woman gets a 'risk fig-
ure', an expression of the individual 
probability of giving birth to a disabled 
child (for example: 'you have a risk of 1 
in 500'), rather than a definitive as-
sessment of the genetic status of the 
child.22 A traditional yes/no diagnosis is 
replaced by a statistical calculation. 
Not 'healthy' or 'not healthy', but 
probably healthy, but maybe not 
healthy. Whether a probability of 1 to 
500 means healthy or sick is ideally 
left to individual interpretation.  
These kinds of uncertainty can be as-
sociated with the notion of specific 
non-knowledge, because they have a 
strong emphasis on cognition. At the 
moment there are no ways of trans-
forming this uncertainty into knowl-
edge, but there is precise knowledge 
about the kind of deficient character of 
this knowledge and thus usually an 
idea of how non-knowledge can be 
translated into knowledge on a me-
dium-term basis. This form of knowl-
edge is therefore in principle charac-
terised by connectability ("Anschluss-
fähigkeit"). In practice, this means that 
there is confidence in being able to 
overcome, at least on a medium-term 
basis, the preliminary character and 
the ambiguity of knowledge with the 
help of additional and more extensive 
information, more precise measure-
ments and tests, better qualified spe-
                                                                 
22 In terms of probability the calculation of 
risks includes, on the one hand, the statis-
tical basic risk correlated with the age of 
the woman. The variation, i.e. the individ-
ual specification of risk, results from the 
measurement of the nuchal translucency 
thickness.  
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cialists, and so on.23 However, the 
people affected may perceive uncer-
tainty as a fundamental and irreducible 
problem. But even in this case (of as-
cription of risk) the problem is framed 
as having the 'right configuration', i.e. 
it is not perceived as a problem that 
would transcend the professional 
frame of interpretation and relevance. 
c) Non-knowledge: it is crucial for my 
argument that the notion of non-
knowledge is not defined in a cognitiv-
ist way (i.e. as a problem of inadequate 
knowledge progress), but rather re-
lated to the level of social action. The 
notion of non-knowledge correlates to 
disabilities that can be discovered by 
prenatal testing and that are supposed 
to transcend bio-medical possibilities 
of interpretation. From this perspec-
tive, non -knowledge is characterised 
by the fact that expert knowledge is 
unable to 'grasp' the specific phenom-
ena; it cannot really assess their sig-
nificance. This should not be under-
stood in the sense that prenatal testing 
would be incapable of understanding 
what is 'constitutive' of disability. The 
argument that medicine can no longer 
claim objectivity as a reference for its 
practice is not an epistemological one. 
It is a sociological argument: with 
regard to certain disabilities, medicine 
obviously can no longer refer to the 
kind of objective meaning which would 
normally result from the close link 
between expert knowledge (diagnosis) 
and decision (treatment), and which 
finds expression in the stable character 
of the distinctions healthy/sick and 
normal/abnormal. The practical impli-
cations for action described above are 
the result. In the context of claims of 
being affected, this problem can entail 
the radical negation of medical knowl-
edge claims (Japp 2002a: 47). 
                                                                 
23 Against this background, the attempt to 
isolate foetal cells from the mother’s blood 
in order to get early and reliable evidence 
about forms of trisomy (Hahn/Holzgreve 
2001) implies the perpetuation of a particu-
lar research logic. 
If we agree with Luhmann that the 
constitution of knowledge is the result 
of a successful ascription of necessar-
ily ambivalent information to a sup-
posedly secure knowledge (and non-
knowledge is therefore a 'construction 
defect'), the analytic benefit of the ter-
minology introduced becomes some-
what clearer: due to its ambiguity, 
disability leaves open several options 
of ascription. By referring to hege-
monic discourses and cultural values it 
can, for instance, be clarified in a way 
that identifies non-knowledge as a 
cognitive problem (consequence: de-
mand for more precise test results, 
better therapies etc.). In this case, non-
knowledge becomes framed as uncer-
tainty. Alternatively, by referring to 
different discourses and alternative 
value orientations, the ambiguity at-
tached to disability can also become 
effective as a tool for the repulsion of 
scientific claims of cognition. In this 
case non-knowledge is not connected 
to the option of continuing scientifica-
tion, but is opened up to external criti-
cism – with politicisation as a conse-
quence. 
Taking the institutionalisation of pre-
natal testing in to consideration, one 
can ask which discourses, norms and 
rules would help to normalise the un-
derstanding of professional practice as 
an appropriate configuration of the 
problem. In what follows, I will ana-
lyse the rationality of concrete bound-
ary-drawings in order to reconstruct 
these discourses and norms.  
 
4 The politics of boundary-
drawing 
Modernisation theory sees boundary-
drawing as essentially related to the 
postulate of boundary blurring ("Ent-
grenzung") of institutions and guiding 
principles. From this perspective, "Ent-
grenzungen", i.e. the dissolution or 
pluralisation of categorical distinctions 
(Viehöver/Gugutzer/Keller/Lau 2004), 
are regarded as indicators of the 
emergence of a 'second' modernity. 
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According to Beck et al. the epochal 
rupture consists of the fact "that the 
guiding ideas of western modernity 
have become questionable because of 
the dynamics of secondary effects" 
(2001: 25). The category of boundary-
drawing becomes interesting for the 
theory of modernisation for one main 
reason: because of its strong hypothe-
sis of an epochal rupture, the theory is 
highly dependent upon criteria for 
empirical testing. A central argument is 
that modernity is reflexive from the 
moment when, as a consequence of 
scientific and technical developments, 
habitual boundaries and patterns of 
thinking are dissolved by means of 
risks and dangers released by (and in) 
the process of modernisation. Such 
boundaries as the difference between 
nature/society, life/death, or healthy/ 
sick (Viehöver 2005) are fundamental 
to the self-understanding of moder-
nity, because they constitute action 
and decision-making resources as well 
as mechanisms for assigning respon-
sibilities. 
From this point of view, boundary 
work provided by the experts is there-
fore regarded as an expression of an 
institutional dynamic, but not as a 
form of strategic management of sym-
bolic boundaries such as Gieryn (1983) 
would propose.24 His concept of 
'boundary work' focuses on the way 
science appropriates, by means of 
boundary work, resources related to 
the privileged position of science, such 
as credibility, prestige and power 
(Gieryn 1995). Finally, the scope of the 
autonomy of science needs to be 
maintained and science needs to be 
protected from external control, for 
                                                                 
24 Gieryn (1983: 782) characterises the 
boundary work of scientists as 'ideological 
efforts'. The way he poses his main ques-
tion, "What images of science do scientists 
present to promote their authority over 
designated domains of knowledge?" (ibid.: 
783), indicates that he understands the 
ideology (of 'scientificality') as an active 
and strategic process of establishing 
boundaries. 
example by delimitating it from other 
functional systems such as policy. 
The boundary-drawing discourse of 
human genetics can therefore be stud-
ied from at least two perspectives. On 
the one hand, boundary construction 
by experts can – with regard to politi-
cal and ethnic conflicts – be seen as a 
strategy designed to legitimise profes-
sional authority (see Cunningham-
Burley/Kerr 1999; Bogner 2004). Mod-
ernisation theory, on the other hand, 
chiefly  considers the way experts deal 
with the opening up of the scope for 
decision-making, a field which is sub-
ject neither to traditional claims nor to 
formal regulations.  
The boundary work of experts can be 
illustrated by taking the urgent prob-
lem of late term abortion as an exam-
ple. The reconstruction of the rational-
ity underlying boundary construction 
in this case can inform us about the 
discourses and value orientations that 
enable experts to provide and imple-
ment the authoritative notions and 
concepts for the interpretation of dis-
abilities to be discovered by prenatal 
testing; the legitimisation of decisions; 
and, thus, the societal debate about 
disabilities. 
4.1 Late term abortion: the prenatal 
boundary between life and death  
Advances in neonatal medicine have 
contributed to rendering the prenatal 
line between life and death more fluid. 
This has become especially problem-
atic with regard to the recently 
amended German abortion law. In the 
course of the 1995 amendment the 
temporal limitation for an abortion 
previously set at the 22nd week (orien-
tated towards the boundary of viabil-
ity) was eliminated. In principle, in 
case the foetus is classified as a 'haz-
ard' to the physical or mental health of 
the pregnant woman, the doctor may 
induce an abortion (if the pregnant 
woman consents) up until shortly be-
fore birth (StGB § 218a, section 2). The 
situation in Austria is similar with re-
spect to the penal code. According to 
30 STI Studies 2005: 17-37 
 
 
Austria's abortion law (in force since 
1975), an abortion based on eugenic 
indications may be conducted up until 
shortly before birth (StBG § 97, section 
1, item 2). 
The dissolution of a definitive, albeit 
pragmatic demarcation presents a 
serious challenge for a gynaecologist. 
Performing an abortion between the 
22nd and the 24th week of pregnancy,25 
at a time when the child is generally 
considered viable, can get doctors into 
a difficult situation with serious con-
sequences.26 Obviously, an absurd and 
irreconcilable dilemma arises if a (non-
punishable) abortion makes necessary 
to perform an act of active euthanasia 
in order to pursue the original inten-
tion. On the other hand, it is obvious 
that the need to take such decisions 
tends to result in a practice which is 
regulated by experts themselves.  
With regard to the exigency of having 
provisional-moral boundary constructs 
(Beck/Bonß/Lau 2004: 15), referring to 
a viability boundary as a criterion of a 
time limit for late term abortions (as 
suggested for example by chamber of 
medical doctors in BÄK 1998) does not 
help in the individual case. Firstly, this 
threshold is fluid as a result of ad-
vances in neonatal medicine, and of 
course it varies in individual cases. 
Finally, the actual week of pregnancy 
cannot even be determined with abso-
lute accuracy. Hence, boundaries keep 
                                                                 
25 A late term abortion in practice essen-
tially means the inducement of labour in 
anticipation that the child will be stillborn. 
In some cases a so-called foetocide is 
performed in order to be sure. Prior to the 
abortion, the foetus is killed by means of a 
potassium chloride injection to the heart. 
26 In Germany around 1,500 abortions are 
performed annually after the 22nd week of 
pregnancy, according to an article in the 
German magazine "Der Spiegel" (Friedrich-
sen/Ludwig 1999). The Federal Agency of 
Statistics reported 190 abortions in 1997, 
but the director of the Hospital Doctors’ 
Association of the Marburger Bund, Frank 
Ulrich Montgomery, estimates approxi-
mately 800 late term abortions per year 
(Sperber 2001). 
dissolving as it is no longer possible to 
discern, based on medical diagnostic 
methods, on which side of the bor der 
one stands at a concrete point in time. 
But even if one disregards ambiguities 
and the need to interpret viability crite-
ria there must be exceptions, either 
due to medical or eugenic indications 
or in cases when, for example, the 
results of an amniocentesis are re-
ceived very late. Hence prenatal diag-
nosticians and gynaecologists are 
faced with the problem of having to 
redraw the prenatal line between life 
and death. Ultimately, the boundary 
construction provides an immediate 
guideline for professional action and 
decision-making. For us, as a result, 
the ensuing question relates to the 
interpretations and considerations 
supporting these boundary construc-
tions. 
4.2 The pluralisation of the life/death 
distinction  
The prenatal boundary between life 
and death, prior to its dissolution over 
the course of the abortion reform, had 
been drawn by the law - which itself 
was orientated toward medical 'facts' 
('the boundary of viability'). For us this 
raises a new and interesting question, 
namely how scientific, judicial or phi-
losophical knowledge plays a role in 
the reconstruction of this boundary. In 
any case, the problem of late term 
abortions is no longer regulated by 
formal law but rather by the informal 
boundary politics of experts. It is the 
experts who are formulating processes 
for dealing with this problem in publi-
cations (e.g. von Kaisen-
berg/Jonat/Kaatsch 2005), in directives 
and statements of professional asso-
ciations (e.g. DGGG 2003), at symposi-
ums and congresses, and also on the 
level of day-to-day internal coopera-
tion and team meetings in hospitals. 
This subpoliticisation, however, is not 
tantamount to an exclusive orientation 
towards medical genetic expertise. In 
the following it will be shown that 
ethical or philosophical knowledge is 
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also of significance for the reformula-
tion of boundaries. 
It is possible to reconstruct the logic of 
boundary-drawing in expert discourse 
based on its discussion of exceptional 
cases. Two different argumentation 
types have been analytically identified 
in connection with the manner in 
which experts classify exceptional 
cases. On the one hand, there is an 
effort to fall back on medical criteria as 
a way of drawing a boundary. This 
means that the legitimisation of late 
term abortion is founded on a poor 
survivability prognosis for the foetus. 
By referring once again to viability in 
this way the pragmatic boundary of the 
former abortion law is more than just 
revived, since this criterion may also 
now be applied to the period after the 
22nd week of pregnancy when deci-
sions are still pos sible. 'Non viable 
deformities' or 'untreatable diseases' 
consequently represent legitimate 
exceptional cases for late term abor-
tions according to the experts I ques-
tioned asked. In an attempt to concre-
tise such terms when they need inter-
pretation, experts tend to draw on the 
medically most clear-cut cases. A con-
crete example is anencephalus which, 
based on a very low survival probabil-
ity, is characterised by experts as a 
'death-like' condition. In such a case 
the continuation of the pregnancy is 
usually deemed pointless or an unnec-
essary risk for the woman. The diag-
nosis 'anencephalus' is therefore asso-
ciated with the demarcation dead/alive. 
Ultimately in this type of argumenta-
tion, the distinction between life/death 
is in a way reintroduced on the side of 
life (i.e. in the time period open to 
decision-making, starting with the 
viability boundary). In view of the in-
terpretational dependency of the ex-
ceptional case, this can be viewed as a 
pluralisation of the demarcation. 
The second type of argumentation may 
also be considered a pluralisation of 
the demarcation, but in a stronger 
sense, since a rationality different than 
that of medicine has a bearing. In this 
case experts do not legitimise late term 
abortions accor ding to the life/death 
distinction set out above. Here, the 
boundary-drawing which becomes 
action-orientative for a problematic 
case beyond the viability boundary, 
refers to the distinction between per-
sonal and non-personal life. Further 
elaborated, this distinction provides 
the basis for the bioethical debate 
which ties granting the right to life to 
the criterion of personhood (e.g. Too-
ley 1979; Singer 1979). The following 
interview passage serves to illustrate 
this second argumentation type, and 
sums up the argument in a very reflex-
ive way. 
Expert (E): I think Prof. N and I both 
found a rather sensible solution to the 
problem of late term abortions here in 
the department. (...) We have a formu-
lation that we draw a line starting with 
the 23rd plus 0th week. In other words, 
the beginning of the 24th week and 
thereafter – and that is now the formu-
lation of T. from A. – the confidence in 
prenatal testing on the one hand, and a 
considerable lack of cognitive develop-
ment on the other must be very likely. 
Yes? Well, if you start at the end of the 
spectrum: anencephalus. There's no 
gestation age limit for anencephalus. 
 
Interviewer (I): Spina bifida?27 
E: No. Well, spina bifida must be diag-
nosed with much care. If associated 
with a large hydrocephalus, then yes, 
this is precisely a case in which one 
has to consider this formulation. 
I: So what exactly is considered a se-
vere cognitive defect? 
                                                                 
27 A congenital deformity of the spine and 
spinal cord (‘cleft spine’) which can appear 
in very different degrees of severity. Disor-
ders accordingly range from slight impair-
ment of the ability to walk to paraplegia 
with bladder and intestinal dysfunctions. 
Most of the time spina bifida is associated 
with hydrocephalus (excessive accumula-
tion of cerebrospinal fluid within the cra-
nium). 
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E: Well. Yes, I have the formulation of 
personhood which is used in philoso-
phical writing. Also, someone lacks a 
consciousness of his own existence, no 
feeling of past and future and no inter-
action with others. That would be the 
criteria of personhood, and there are 
such children. That can be operationa l-
ised up to a certain point. 
I: So that can really be operationalised? 
E: Yes. Yes, that can be operationalised. 
So when it's clear that this child will 
never be able to have interaction with a 
counterpart, whether from a philoso-
phical or theological point of view, it 
will not develop a consciousness of its 
own self, it will not develop a con-
sciousness for the past or future, or for 
any other perspective, then, well…. 
(2:113/632:677) 
This second argumentation type can 
be considered reflexive in as much as 
the fiction of a clear possibility of dif-
ferentiation is dismissed by means of 
the viability criterion. Diagnoses come 
to the fore (e.g. spina bifida) which are 
ambiguous, and which remain hidden 
in the first argumentation type and 
then must be decided ad hoc in prac-
tice. The professional orientations to 
action as observed in the second case 
are directed toward criteria founded in 
ethics rather than medicine. In the end 
an effort is made to solve the problem 
of drawing the line by referring to ethi-
cal rather than medical categories. By 
means of the term personhood, man-
kind is divided into purely biological 
life forms and persons characterised 
by autonomy, rationality and self-
awareness. For the legitimisation of a 
late term abortion this essentially boils 
down to the distinction between a 
dignified and undignified life (although 
not from a perspective with a eugeni-
cally objectified 'worth living' orienta-
tion). The terms autonomy and self-
awareness thereby entail specific de-
mands for actively shaping the individ-
ual's life through anticipation and acts 
of choice (Rose 1998). As general prin-
ciples of governing the individual's life 
in late modernity these terms consti-
tute, in such a perspective, guiding 
principles of society. In the bioethical 
concept of personhood, these guiding 
ideas essentially support a logically 
consistent convergence on a universal 
concept for the valuation of life. 
The question of the (by no means un-
problematic)28 relationship between 
bioethical discourse and societal no-
tions of normality becomes important 
in the light of the general question of 
the significance of normality concepts 
for professional actions and decision-
making. Beyond the present context, 
one can ask which framework of ac-
tion, for example an expert lacking the 
pertinent training in bioethics, when 
forced to make a decision. According 
to the perspective developed here, it 
will be a framework of action which 
has been delimited in a logically con-
sistent manner by bioethics and cen-
tred on the guiding principle of auton-
omy. Since – in line with the liberal 
school of bioethics – moral impera-
tives are developed from the hege-
monic value system of society and the 
normative is strictly anchored in the 
empirically observable (Braun 2000: 
108-135), the bioethical discourse 
must be understood as an expression 
as well as an elaboration and generali-
sation of societal normality concepts 
that are crystallised in the fundamental 
questions: What is a life worth living? 
What is a human being? 
 
5 Conclusion and outlook: re-
flexive experts? 
Prenatal testing is marked by scientifi-
cally technical dynamics which un-
                                                                 
28 The logically compelling argument of 
utilitarians for permission to kill newborn 
babies (since a newborn can never be a 
person) will meet with resistance from the 
population. However, it is precisely the 
stringency of analytical operations which 
suggests, with the reference to normality, a 
need to adapt biopolitical norms and regu-
lations in a way that would result in the 
liberalisation of contra-intuitive practices.  
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dermine the stability of institutional-
ised decision-making conventions. 
Decision and design necessities for 
experts result from the evolving ambi-
guities of categorical definitions 
(healthy/sick, life/death) which require 
new boundary constructions. Specific 
professional orientations to action 
have been reconstructed here by 
analysis of these constructions. In the 
process it became clear that concrete 
professional orientations to action 
draw their cognitive-oriented and le-
gitimising power from the implicit 
reference to society's guiding princi-
ples and notions of normality. These 
societal guiding principles operational-
ise themselves, according to the exam-
ple of the more or less subpolitical 
regulation of late term abortions, in 
the form of a certain ideal of rational-
ity. Categories such as autonomy, in-
teractivity or self-awareness together 
make up the differentiation between 
person/non-person, a complement to 
the blurred life/death distinction. Ad-
mission into a social community there-
fore no longer depends on biological 
but on cognitive criteria, which require 
a minimum command over oneself as 
a precondition for a life worth living. 
But the revaluation of an impartial, 
process-oriented and client-centred 
counselling ideal, which is centred 
around the guiding principle of indi-
vidual decision-making autonomy, 
also illustrates the close link between 
professional practice and society's 
guiding principles. In connection with 
the problem of boundary drawing, this 
revaluation can be regarded as an in-
dication that the reference to expert 
knowledge no longer appears suffi-
cient for the reformulation of prena-
tally diagnosable disabilities in the 
medical code, nor for the distinction 
between legitimate and non-legitimate 
practice as a consequence. On the 
level of discourse, the hegemony of a 
liberal autonomy principle seems to be 
expressed in the counselling ideal 
which has become the guiding princi-
ple for the regulation and handling of 
'life and death questions' in the context 
of (bio-)medical progress.29 According 
to Erwin K. Scheuch (2003), in the light 
of this close link between professional 
action orientations and society's guid-
ing principles it would be conceivable 
to speak of the "meaning of the spirit 
of the age for medicine". 
Far-reaching conclusions follow con-
sidering the non-knowledge problem 
mentioned earlier. The concept of non-
knowledge has been linked with pre-
natally diagnosable disabilities be-
cause it can be, and is in practice, as-
sociated with transcending in principle 
the scope of interpretations of medi-
cine. Hence, non-knowledge as a 'phe-
nomenon of assignment' is based on 
the legitimacy of the scientific inter-
pretational framework. This concep-
tion analytically sensitises us to the 
question of which factors contribute to 
making 'objects to be dealt with' le-
gitimate objects of research practice. 
Regarding the institutionalisation and 
normalisation of prenatal testing (as 
described), one can assume that the 
reference to society's guiding princi-
ples is a factor both in boundary poli-
tics and in the redesign of the counsel-
ling process. This factor is dysfunc-
tional for a broad challenge to knowl-
edge claims or for formulating a gen-
eral suspicion of irrelevance. Provided 
experts draw boundaries conforming 
to norms and their decisions largely 
correspond to the expectations of so-
ciety concerning what is acknowledged 
as their job, what is considered worth 
knowing and possible to say, and 
which taboos exist,30 non-knowledge 
                                                                 
29 From the range of existing bioethical 
literature, the following sources can be 
cited as theoretically elaborated and influ-
ential in practice: for a pragmatic perspec-
tive Beauchamp/Childress (1994), and for 
more general accounts Harris (1991) and 
Charlesworth (1993). 
30 Not only eugenic practices and value-
attributing counselling are taboos. An im-
portant taboo which cannot be further 
elaborated here is the application of prena-
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is not communicated. Consequently, 
professional authority (as defined in 
section 1) does not need to be called 
into question.31 Non-knowledge re-
mains a cognitive problem and not a 
reason for politicisation. Hence, non-
knowledge is not necessarily dysfunc-
tional for science; however, it is not 
per se functional, a point Merton has 
already captured in his interpretation 
of a necessary 'spe cification'. 
In view of the self-relativisation of 
experts in the course of the revaluation 
of client-oriented counselling or the 
experimental raising of ethical aspects 
within the field of prenatal testing, one 
can now ask whether we can observe a 
reflexive type of expert emerging in the 
case of human genetics, as May and 
Holzinger (2003) have suggested. They 
argue that, as a special field in medi-
cine, human genetics with its aetiology 
and improved diagnostic techniques 
transcends the established paradigms 
and principles of medical knowledge. 
Experts are forced to communicate 
uncertainty, which makes the rele-
vance of human genetic knowledge 
appear questionable to the client and 
is therefore dysfunctional for the 
medical monopoly on interpretation 
and for expert status (ibid.: 105). The 
revaluation of a layperson's perspec-
tive in genetic counselling, i.e. the 
tendency to dissolve the traditional 
dichotomy between experts and lay-
persons, can be interpreted as reflexiv-
ity on an institutional level. The taking 
into account of the blurring of the 
distinction healthy/sick in professional 
practice indicates the cognitive level of 
the reflexivity criterion. 
From a sociology of science perspec-
tive which focuses on the underlying 
                                                                              
tal testing for sex determination (GfH 
1990). 
31 The expert practices mentioned cannot 
be equated with strategic intentional ac-
tion. In fact, my analysis was guided by the 
assumption that certain practices and 
demarcations can be read ex post as func-
tional for the legitimacy of professional 
authority. 
rationalities of counselling and the 
decision-making process, reservations 
are certainly in order concerning the 
hypothesis of reflexivity. In today's 
reality the expert in fact no longer has 
the power to make decisions and issue 
directives. However, in the context of 
the interpretation presented here, the 
(undoubted) dissolution of asymmetri-
cal interaction relationships in genetic 
counselling must be read differently 
than as a reference to the contours of 
a reflexive modernity. A larger degree 
of autonomy indeed signifies a loss of 
professional authority pretending to 
offer socially binding solutions to 
problems. This, however, does not 
amount to a loss of relevance for ex-
pert knowledge. The expert who sees 
himself as an impartial and client-
oriented information provider, and 
whose decisions and demarcations are 
ultimately structured based on hege-
monic concepts of normality, does not 
seem questionable; if anything, the 
opposite is the case. His knowledge, 
his terminology and his profession are 
instrumental in the prenatal debate 
about the phenomenon of disability. 
The problem awareness and reflection 
of laypersons cannot be separated 
from the sensitisation by the criteria 
and categories which are significantly 
influenced by medical expertise. 
Hence, the expert has the power to 
decide who and under what conditions 
is allowed to participate in the deci-
sion-making process and which terms 
will be used in that process. 
From this perspective, reflexivity would 
require the possibility of dealing with 
the experts' interpretation schemes 
and definitions of relevance in a reflex-
ive way to be structurally embedded in 
the context of pregnancy care, for ex-
ample in the form of an institutionali-
sation of alternative forms of knowl-
edge in the counselling process. 
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